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Focusing particularly on the role of the clock in social life, this article explores the 
conventions we use to “tell the time.” I argue that although clock time generally appears 
to be an all-encompassing tool for social coordination, it is actually failing to coordinate 
us with some of the most pressing ecological changes currently taking place. Utilizing 
philosophical approaches to performativity to explore what might be going wrong, I 
then draw on Derrida’s and Haraway’s understandings of social change in order to 
suggest a fairly unconventional, but perhaps more accurate, mode of reckoning time in 
the context of climate change, resource depletion, and mass extinctions.
In attempting to explain humanity’s seeming inability to respond 
swiftly and proportionately to the massive ecological changes currently 
taking place, environmentalist Bill McKibben has suggested that one 
of the key problems is not a lack of political will or capacity for agency. 
Instead, he argues that we are in the grips of a “fatal confusion about 
the nature of time and space” (2003, 7). !is confusion rests on the 
implicit distinction Western societies make between the time of culture 
and the time of nature. !at is, even while it is commonly assumed 
that time is all-encompassing, McKibben notes that “though we know 
that our culture has placed our own lives on a demonic fast-forward, 
we imagine that the earth must work on some other time-scale” (2003, 
7). !e accelerated shifts in technology over the last couple of decades, 
for example, seem far removed from the much slower scale changes 
wrought by evolution or plate tectonics. As McKibben writes, “the long 
slow accretion of epochs—the Jurassic, the Cretaceous, the Pleistocene—
lulls us into imagining that the physical world o"ers us an essentially 
stable background against which we can run our race” (ibid.). We thus 
seem to think, suggests McKibben, that while culture is in time, nature 
somehow is not. 
#at makes this confusion a potentially fatal one is the fact that the 
natural world is, of course, far from stable. As McKibben recounts in his 
article, this supposed “backdrop” to human life is rapidly changing, with 
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glaciers and icecaps melting at unprecedented rates, mass extinctions, 
and widespread resource depletion. Ironically, he argues that as climate 
change accelerates, it is humankind who has become slow-moving and 
seemingly unchanging. He thus argues that “the contrast between two 
speeds is the key fact of our age: between the pace at which the physical 
world is changing and the pace at which human society is reacting to 
this change” (ibid., 12). However, both of these speeds are obscured 
when nature is treated simply as a background to human life. 
McKibben’s diagnosis of a temporal confusion in regard to timing, 
synchronization, and pace echoes in the work of a wide variety of 
environmental philosophers, who argue that there are many problematic 
temporal assumptions deeply embedded within Western systems of 
knowledge. !e con"ation between the passage of time and progress, 
the obfuscations of linearity, the destructiveness of hyper-acceleration, 
and the denial of coevalness are amongst some of the usual suspects. 
#at this suggests is that a key task of the environmental humanities 
is transforming the temporal framework that supports the radical de-
coupling of what has been classed as “nature” from that which has been 
classed as “culture.”
#at is particularly interesting about McKibben’s diagnosis 
of a “fatal confusion” is that his concern with time is not necessarily 
metaphysical, or even existential, but rather highlights the seemingly 
prosaic problem of co-ordination. Arguably the primary use of time 
within social life is to provide methods of enabling and managing the 
timing of encounters, meetings, tasks and activities. !is can be seen 
through the wide array of calendars, schedules, timetables, and so on, 
that arise from social institutions, logistical systems, personal life, and 
communications systems. Yet, far from being able to coordinate our 
actions with the signi$cant changes our world is currently undergoing, 
we are increasingly out of synch. Schedules for transitioning to low-
carbon energy production, for implementing truly sustainable $shing 
policies, or for developing transport systems independent of cheap fossil 
fuels, for example, are all running decades behind. Our conventions 
for coordinating ourselves—for telling the time—are thus simply not 
adequate in the current context. 
Despite this, we don’t seem to have lost faith in our ability to 
tell the time. Statements such as, “It is now 11:23 a.m.,” continue to 
make sense, to feel like an unquestionable fact. One reason for this 
is that, in providing a blank, seemingly objective, framework, clock-
time transcends our di%erent scheduling tools, providing a means of 
translating between each one. In doing so the clock appears to promise 
that everything can be assigned to its proper time. However, one of the 
key problems is that even while the clock appears to be all-encompassing, 
it actually only a%ords certain relations, while obscuring others. I take 
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this to be the crux of McKibben’s argument—that the inter-relations 
between “nature” and “culture” are hidden because one is not thought 
to be in the time of the other. !en we look at a clock or calendar 
we can see fairly quickly whether we are becoming out-of-synch with 
some worlds, but not with others. "at is, while the clock appears to 
do very well in a#ording the “demonic fast-forward” of contemporary 
capitalism, the equally alarming acceleration of climate change seems 
to be occurring in a di#erent realm from the everyday lives of many of 
us. We coordinate ourselves with work, school, and transport schedules, 
with periodic bill payments, public holidays, and anniversaries, while 
our e#orts to respond to climate change are squeezed into the spare 
moments around this, if at all. So while the clock can tell me whether 
I am late for work, it cannot tell me whether it is too late to mitigate 
runaway climate change.
In focusing our attention on the problems of coordination and 
synchronization, McKibben gestures towards an issue that has been 
relatively under-explored in philosophy—time’s role in managing 
the intertwined relationality of everyday life. Indeed, what I want 
to propose in this article is that, in the current context of multiple 
ecological crises, time needs to be more clearly understood, not as a 
quantitative measurement, but as a powerful social tool for producing, 
managing, and/or undermining various understandings of who or what 
is in relation with other things or beings.1 Seen in this way, the act of 
“telling the time” gains a political and ethical dimension that is absent 
from our usual understandings of time-keeping. Importantly, such an 
understanding of time can extend philosophical interest in the issue 
beyond metaphysical and phenomenological questions, towards an 
examination of the choices communities make about the way they will 
tell time and thus who or what they choose to keep time with.
I will begin by looking more closely at the notion of time-
keeping, partly in order to expand what counts as a “clock,” but also 
to pry open the common-sense notion of time as an objective form of 
measurement. In contrast, I will discuss how di#erent clocks are used 
in di#erent contexts, emphasizing in particular their materiality and 
contingency. Understanding the time we use in everyday life as a set of 
conventions, rather than as a simple fact, opens up the opportunity to 
analyze statements about time in novel ways. I’m particularly intrigued 
by the possibility of reading statements, such as “It is now 11:23 
a.m.,” as performative, rather than constantive statements. Notions 
of performativity have played an important role within philosophy 
in e#orts to unsettle and rework seemingly objective categories, with 
  "is way of understanding time is particularly indebted to the work of the 
anthropologist Carol Greenhouse (see especially Greenhouse 1996).
MICHELLE BASTIAN26
Judith Butler’s treatment of gender being the most prominent example 
(1990). For Jacques Derrida, speech act theory illuminates the key 
question of ethics and politics, namely how to understand the relation 
between intention and rules or conventions (1988, 97).2 In both cases 
the interest is in understanding the possibilities of social change, while 
acknowledging the intractability of conventions and traditions. 
So after highlighting the social, rather than objective, nature of 
clock-time, I will then move to a discussion of J. L. Austin’s speech 
act theory in order to suggest that statements about time are not best 
understood as constantive statements, but as performatives that enact 
particular forms of relationality. Time is, of course, a multi-layered 
phenomenon that draws together a variety of experiences, material 
processes, and social conventions. But in focusing on time as a tool 
for managing the intertwined relationality of everyday life, I want 
to foreground the clock as a convention, one we implicitly assent to 
whenever we utilize it. Indeed, what I want to suggest is that rather 
than being a simple statement of fact, the statement, “It is now 11:23 
a.m.,” might be better understood as a statement of faith—in particular, 
faith that the clock will enable us to coordinate ourselves, and thus 
maintain ourselves in relation, with those things and beings that are 
most important and relevant to our daily lives. 
If we come to understand the act of telling the time as performative 
then two questions arise in regard to the clock. First, how are we to 
understand our common-sense faith in our clocks and our concomitant 
inability to “keep to time” in the current context? In responding to 
this question I will address the issues of context and intentionality by 
discussing J. L. Austin’s attempts to understand when speech acts go 
wrong, as well as Sara Ahmed’s re-interpretation of his work and her 
concept of “non-performativity.” Second, if we recognize that our clocks 
are indeed failing to coordinate us in a variety of necessary ways, how 
else might we go about telling the time? Here I am guided by Derrida 
and Donna Haraway, who both argue for the importance of recognizing 
the way new conceptual models already subsist within the system one 
is seeking to critique. I am particularly interested in bringing together 
Derrida’s notion of the “originary performative” and Haraway’s work 
on material-semiotic !gurations in order to outline a number of key 
issues that would be involved in articulating other modes of measuring 
  Indeed Derrida is so convinced of its importance that he goes as far as to 
say that “speech act theory is fundamentally and in its most fecund, most rigor-
ous, and most interesting aspects . . .a theory of right or law, of convention, of 
political ethics or of politics as ethics. It describes . . . the pure conditions of 
an ethical-political discourse insofar as this discourse involves the relation of 
intentionality to conventionality or to rules” (1988, 97). 
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or reckoning time that may well be more appropriate in what Deborah 
Bird Rose and !om van Dooren have called, the “time of extinctions” 
(2011). After looking brie"y at some examples of current interventions 
into the public perception of time, I will conclude by suggesting that 
responding to the dischrony McKibben highlights may require a very 
di#erent type of clock altogether, one that does not promise a new 
synchrony but that can “coordinate” us in a complex multi-species 
world, in which there are co-occurring and con"icting actions, values, 
loyalties, fears, and hopes.
Conventions and Clocks
!e OED de$nes “clock” quite simply as “an instrument for the 
measurement of time.” !e word itself comes from the Old English term 
for bell.3 And in its proper use, “clock” refers to a device that indicates 
time through bells or chimes, as well as through hands on a clock-face. 
In this section, though, I am interested in prying open this common-
sense understanding of what a clock is by asking broader questions 
about the usefulness of clocks in our everyday lives. %y, for example, 
might a continuous series of chimes (or movements on a clock-face) be 
so signi$cant for organizing daily life?
An initial clue comes from Aristotle, who notes that our capacity to 
perceive time is interlinked with our capacity to perceive change. In his 
complex discussion of the nature of time in the Physics, he argues that in 
order to experience time, one $rst has to be able to notice a change and 
then make a comparison between two di#erent moments, “before” and 
“after” the change. %en we do not notice a “before” and an “after” we 
do not perceive time as passing. !at is, “when the state of our minds 
does not change at all, or we have not noticed its changing, we do not 
think that time has elapsed” (Aristotle 1984, 218b, 22–24). !is suggests 
that while clocks may be understood as devices for measuring time, 
they could also be understood as devices for providing communities 
with continuous and predictable “befores” and “afters.” In so doing 
they become useful because they enable us to reliably notice change 
and so perceive time as passing.
Importantly, in linking the experience of time to the perception of 
change, rather than to objective change, Aristotle’s account has the 
potential to enlarge our common-sense understanding of the clock 
  Interestingly, while it seems more normal now to symbolise the clock visu-
ally, or to talk about “watching the clock,” historically clocks have provided 
time aurally, through bells and chimes rather than a clock-face (Glennie and 
!rift 2009, 82). !is is partly because bells could be heard across a much great-
er distance than a clock-face could be seen, thus bringing more people into 
coordinated relations with each other. 
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further by emphasizing the importance of asking what counts as change 
and for whom. As already noted in the beginning, not all types of change 
register equally. !e fatal confusion McKibben points towards arises 
from the disconnect between our ability to perceive change in the social 
world and our seeming inability to perceive change in what has been 
excised into the sphere of nature. !e possibility that the perception of 
change underpinning shared understandings of social or public time 
may be variable (both within and between cultures) has not, however, 
been of central concern within the philosophy of time. Instead it is the 
philosopher-turned-sociologist Emile Durkheim who provides a second 
clue as to the potential for understanding clocks more broadly.
Put brie"y Durkheim argues that the comparison between di#erent 
moments does not occur abstractly, but is always made in reference to 
what is most relevant to a particular society or group. He notes that it 
is impossible to “represent what the notion of time would be without 
the processes by which we divide it . . . a time which is not a succession 
of years, months, weeks, days and hours” (1965, 22). Importantly, such 
divisions are neither objective, nor are they arbitrary. Rather Durkheim 
argues that they are developed in reference to what is signi$cant within 
our communal lives and “correspond to the periodical recurrence of 
rites, feasts, and public ceremonies” (23). With regard to the notion of 
a “week,” for example, Eviatar Zerubavel suggests that this device to 
measure time derives, not only from religious traditions, but also from 
the cycle of market days (1985, 10). Indeed while the seven day week is 
relatively taken for granted in many parts of the world, a “week” can vary 
from between three and ten days (e.g., 45). Of course, not everything 
about time is attributable to culture, but Durkheim’s approach suggests 
that the use of time in everyday life is not apolitical, and, crucially, that 
individual and collective judgments about signi$cance and relevance 
are utilized in the process of recognizing what counts as a change that 
is signi$cant enough to produce a “before” and an “after.” 
Since what is signi$cant will vary between groups and contexts, 
the set of changes chosen to mark the passing of time also vary. !e 
conventional clock is far from being our only tool for marking time. 
Instead a great variety of material objects are tracked or monitored in 
our e#orts to coordinate ourselves with what is important to us. For 
example, the change in position of the sun in the sky, the changes 
in the composition of layers of rocks, or the change in an atom as its 
electrons shift energy levels, are all speci$c changes that are useful in 
di#erent contexts for providing a system for coordinating how things 
and beings are inter-related. Importantly, although time is generally 
understood to be all encompassing, our varying ways of telling the 
time, through the use of di#erent data sets, only coordinate particular 
kinds of activities. For example, using the variations between layers 
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of rock to tell the time is highly relevant within the speci!c contexts 
of geological and archaeological research. Seriation and stratigraphy 
both utilize the layering of rocks to determine how di"erent types of 
rocks, fossils, and artifacts are ordered in relation to each other. In this 
case a shift from one type of rock to another becomes the signi!cant 
change that provides the archaeologist or geologist with a method of 
coordinating the information they have to hand and are interested in 
understanding. #is method of telling the time is meaningless, however, 
for a receptionist needing to coordinate an organization’s parcel pick-
up times. $at this brief example suggests it that particular methods 
for telling the time facilitate particular kinds of interactions and do not 
necessarily translate well across contexts. 
#e particularity of ways of telling the time holds true even for 
those methods that are commonly understood to be universal. #e 
sun, for example, would seem to be the quintessential object that has 
been tracked and monitored throughout history in order for human 
beings to coordinate themselves with each other and with the world.4 
#e regular and predictable changes in its positions in the sky provide 
a set of changes that have much broader signi!cance than the layering 
of rocks. #e time given to us by the sun may thus appear to be all-
encompassing, with day and night continuing to regulate our activities 
even with our extensive use of standard clocks. However, as E.P. 
#ompson has suggested to “labour from dawn to dusk can appear to 
be “natural” in a farming community” (1967, 60). Nevertheless, the sun 
is not necessarily the primary timing device, for “!shing and seafaring 
people [who] must integrate their lives with the tides” (1967, 59). In this 
case the moon is a more signi!cant provider of data for telling the time. 
Neither is the kind of time provided by the sun of primary usefulness for 
those involved in care-work, for example, who may need to coordinate 
themselves with the varying and unpredictable rhythms of the ill or 
a newborn child. In this case it is the changes in the person or child 
themselves that will regulate the timing of activities. Importantly, these 
other modes of telling the time do not coexist harmoniously with the 
time told by the sun, but result in a variety of social exclusions for those 
who do not operate in accordance with more socially common rhythms 
(Adam 2006, 124). 
However, while one can even make the case for solar time being 
useful for facilitating interactions only in speci!c (if broad) contexts, 
the context-bound nature of devices more properly understood as 
  #e role of the sun (along with the moon and stars) in telling the time is 
even ordained in the Bible: “Let there be lights in the expanse of the sky to 
separate the day from the night, and let them serve as signs to mark seasons and 
days and years” (Genesis 1:14, NIV).
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clocks is even less obvious. !eir precision, reliability, and extremely 
"ne gradation enable them to appear in a wide variety of situations as 
context-free tools for coordination. !us, in daily life the time told by 
the clock is more often experienced as an objective (if burdensome) fact, 
rather than as a contingent, context-speci"c convention. As Barbara 
Adam writes, “the time of the clock is quanti"ed and standardized, 
una#ected by context and seasons” (1998, 70). However, just as the 
kinds of “clocks” discussed above depend upon a particular material 
context in reference to which particular changes can be foregrounded, 
neither is the clock free of context. Instead it is itself tied to its own 
particular materiality. “Seconds,” for example, are currently based upon 
the “before” and “after” produced by tracking the changes occurring 
within cesium atoms when electrons shift energy levels. Despite the 
seeming obscurity of these changes, they become signi"cant and 
relevant in a wide variety of contexts because of their precise consistency. 
!is precision facilitates the accurate co-ordination of the trillions of 
bits of information transmitted through satellites, computers, mobile 
phones, and GPS devices. In fact, it is partly due to the way social life 
is mediated by these particular atoms that the “demonic fast forward” 
pace of life that McKibben highlights is possible. 
$ile cesium atoms are useful for facilitating a broad range 
of interactions, this does not mean that they provide a universal 
framework for coordination. !is has already been argued extensively 
across the humanities and social sciences with regard to the inability of 
clocks to translate between quantitative and qualitative time. Indeed 
it has become common to argue that standard clocks act to obscure 
and de-legitimize qualitative experiences of time. However, what I 
am particularly interested in demonstrating is the way that cultural 
decisions having to do with signi"cance and relevance, as well as the 
particularity of material contexts, are still at work at the very heart of 
quantitative time. 
!at is, while the precision of atomic time would appear to have 
solved the problem of devising an accurate and consistent clock, atomic 
clocks cannot synchronize precisely with the rotation of the Earth, since 
this rotation is variable. !is means that if we told time by the atomic 
clock alone, our clocks would eventually become desynchronized from 
solar time. In order to avoid this, the clock-time used in daily life is not 
actually a single form of measurement, but rather the result of an attempt 
to coordinate between two di#erent kinds of time—International Atomic 
time (TAI, told in reference to the cesium atom) and Universal Time 1 
(UT1, the successor to GMT which is told in reference to the rotation 
of the earth). !e time told on our clocks is actually a third “time”—
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC)—which negotiates between solar 
time and atomic time through the augmentation of TAI with “leap 
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seconds” (Essen 1968, Nelson et al. 2001). As the rotation of Earth is 
not consistent, but varies over time and is currently slowing, the number 
of leap seconds that need to be added is predicted to increase (Nelson 
et al. 2001, 519). Because these irregularities cause signi!cant issues for 
a variety of communications systems, there are currently debates over 
whether to discontinue the use of leap seconds altogether. Despite the 
potential loss of synchronization with solar time, many are arguing that 
this is of less consequence than the di"culties produced for I.T. systems 
(e.g., Chang 2012a, 2012b).
#us, even the seemingly objective clock requires ongoing decisions 
about what is of signi!cance to us, and consequently which elements of 
our world we want to keep to time with and which elements we can 
a$ord to drop from our sphere of direct concern. Given the central role 
of choice, values, relevance, and decision to the production of clock-
time, it is therefore not at all the case that clock time is context-free, nor 
is it produced simply through the objective measurement of reliable 
change. Instead, it arises as the result of the negotiation between the 
desire for “objective” or context-free precision and the recognition that 
we are nonetheless bound by our shared context, by our lives spent on 
an unsteadily turning globe. 
A clock is thus much more than a simple measuring device. 
Indeed, in light of the above discussion, I want to propose the need 
for a broader de!nition of the clock, which, for the purposes of this 
article, is a device that signals change in order for its users to maintain an awareness 
of, and thus be able to coordinate themselves with, what is signi.cant to them. Moving 
away from the notion that a clock merely measures time, this de!nition 
enables us to more readily acknowledge the choices involved in how 
we go about telling the time. Further, each clock can be read as an 
a"rmation of a shared social relation to something—to the layering of 
rocks, to the sun, to a particular type of atom. Rather than measuring 
a disembodied time, clocks become profoundly material. #ey also 
become more closely connected with issues of faith and belief, since in 
telling the time we can be understood as expressing our faith that the 
physical referent utilized by the clock will tell us what we need to know 
about the world and enable us to keep coordinated and synchronized. 
However, when these choices are ill-considered, or when conditions 
change and our clocks are not re-calibrated, problems arise. Using the 
wrong time scale in the wrong context, we risk tricking ourselves into 
thinking we are aware of, and thus able to coordinate with, those other 
beings or things that are most crucial, when in fact we may be falling 
further and further behind.
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Time as (Non-)Performative Statement
On the face of it, making a statement that tells the time does not feel like 
an act of faith, as I suggested above, but rather something we simply 
read o! a mechanical or digital device. And yet, I want to suggest that 
we are, in part, a"rming that the information it provides us with will 
apply to the world in such a way that it will enable us to coordinate 
ourselves with others. #at if, then, to tell the time is to a"rm that 
the device proposed as the most valid or relevant for managing our 
inter-relationality with others (in our case the device that negotiates the 
relation between the cesium atom and the movements of Earth) will 
provide us with the right “time”? If this is the case, then to make the 
statement “It is now 11:23 a.m.” is not to make a simple statement of 
fact about how the world is ordered; rather it is an act that orders the 
world in particular ways. In this sense, then, statements that tell the 
time are not factual descriptions, but performative acts.
Understanding how and why performative statements go wrong is 
a quite di!erent task to understanding why a statement of fact may go 
wrong. Rather than being examined solely in terms of their truthfulness, 
performatives are analyzed in terms of the conventions and contexts 
within which they occur and the intentions of those making them. 
$us, approaching statements about time as performative, rather than 
descriptive, enables us to ask quite di!erent questions about how 
statements about time work or do not work and thus enables us to 
add another layer to the present analysis of humanity’s fatal confusion 
about time.
First developed by J. L. Austin (1962), speech act theory proposes 
that along with the constantive statements that are traditionally the 
focus of philosophical analysis (that is, those statements that report, 
state, or describe), there are also modes of speech that do things, that 
perform and make things happen or occur—known as speech acts 
or performatives. One of the most well used examples of this is the 
statement “I do” within a wedding ceremony. Austin argues that this 
statement is not a description of the promise made but is the actual 
performance of the act of promising. 
A performative that works (sometimes described as a felicitous or 
happy performative) conforms to two criteria. First, it occurs within 
well-regulated and accepted conventions. For “I do” to work, for 
example, it has to occur within the context of a recognizable marriage 
ceremony and be accepted within law. Second the person uttering the 
performative has to believe that her or his statement is true and intend 
to act as if it were the case (1962, 14-15). So for “I do” to be a felicitous 
speech act, it has to also be uttered by someone who actually means it 
and who intends to act in accordance with this promise in the future. If 
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both of these conditions are met, then saying “I do” accomplishes what 
it sets out to do. 
Initially it would seem, even when we understand telling the time as 
a performative, that statements about time should still work according 
to Austin’s criteria. !at is, when we look at the clock and say “it is 
now 3:30 p.m.,” we are using regulated and accepted conventions, we 
genuinely believe it to be the case, and we will act as if this were the case 
in the future. However, it is when we analyze statements about time 
through the broader lens I suggested above that it becomes clearer why 
the act of telling the time, in a world with a changing climate, might 
actually be so infelicitous, or unhappy, that it may actually be better 
understood as the “fatal confusion” that McKibben pronounces it to 
be. 
First is the issue of context and convention. !at is, are we really 
making statements about time in a context where they can do the work 
we want them to do? As I suggested above, telling the time can be 
understood as an act of faith that a"rms that the data set provided 
by tracking the “before” and “after” of a particular material encounter 
(be it with tides, rocks, a star, or an atom) will provide us with the 
information required to coordinate and/or synchronize key activities, 
events, or relations. However in a context where humans are failing 
to coordinate with some of the most important changes shaping the 
current world, to continue to tell the time in the same ways brings about 
the e#ect of not being in time, of being out of synch and uncoordinated.
!at is, rather than re$ecting our current context, our conventions 
for telling the time (and UTC in particular) provide support to the 
sense of a stable background that McKibben seeks to challenge. !is 
is because time told with ultimate reference to the cesium atom tells 
us the before and after of a well-regulated and unchanging interval. 
It does not provide us with a measure of the time before and after the 
mass extinction event currently taking place, before and after resource 
depletion, before and after dramatic changes in sea levels, before and 
after climate change. Rather than representing the urgency and danger 
of these changes, clock time emphasizes continuity and similarity 
across all moments and projects an empty and unending future. %ile 
it appears useful to us because it appears to be all encompassing, this 
appearance of utility is increasingly dangerous, since within a mode 
of time that does not discriminate between types of moments, global 
warming becomes incorporated into the $ow of moments as just one 
more problem in the long list of things wrong with the world. As 
McKibben suggests, global warming can be treated as a minor concern, 
or lifestyle issue, rather than the crisis that it is. It would seem, then, 
that although our context has shifted our conventions have failed to 
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follow suit. As a result, our statements about time are not felicitous but 
might more properly be understood as “mis!res” (Austin 1962, 16).
With regard to the second issue of intention, however, things are a 
little more complicated. "ere is little doubt that western societies, in 
particular, are highly invested in telling the time. Clocks are an ever-
present element of personal and public life. Time-management gurus 
promise us that we can be productive beyond our wildest dreams if 
we follow their multiplying techniques for organizing our lives and 
priorities. However, despite this overwhelming commitment to time, 
something is still missing the mark. #at I want to suggest is that 
perhaps, in the current context, our statements about time might be 
understood not simply as performatives that produce, rather than 
describe, the world, but as a particular kind of performative developed 
by Sara Ahmed which she terms “non-performative.”
In articulating the notion of the non-performative, Ahmed argues 
that it applies to cases where “the failure of the speech act to do what 
it says is not a failure of intent or even circumstance, but is actually 
what the speech act is doing” (2005, §3). In developing this account she 
does not discuss time speci!cally. Rather her interest is in !nding ways 
of analyzing statements about anti-racism and diversity, particularly 
those made in whiteness studies (2004) and in institutional diversity 
and equality statements (2005). She notes that despite the prevalence 
of such statements and their being perceived as a key part of the process 
of addressing racism, they still fail to perform as one might expect. 
Instead, Ahmed argues that despite the overt intentions of many of those 
involved in drafting a statement, the statement itself actually blocks the 
performance of the necessary follow-up actions that would show that 
the commitment was sincere (2005, §17). For Ahmed, the danger of 
anti-racist statements is that they are taken as proof that the person 
or organization making the statement actually is anti-racist. Having 
produced the diversity statement, for example, Ahmed claims that “it is 
as if the University now says: if we are committed to anti-racism (and we 
have said we are), then how can we be racists?” (2005, §10). Reference 
to the existence of a diversity statement is taken as su$cient proof that 
the institution itself is aligned with the content of the statement. 
As Austin himself argues, a performative commonly necessitates, 
that “either the speaker himself or other persons should also perform 
certain other actions” (1962, 8). And yet, in the case of the statements that 
Ahmed discusses, it would appear that the e%ect of diversity statements 
has been precisely to enable the avoidance of performing the necessary 
follow on actions that would be required of a sincere commitment to 
diversity and equality. As such, these statements are “non-performative” 
because they “work by not bringing about the e,ects that they name.” "at is 
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“such speech acts are taken up as if they are performatives (as if they 
have brought about the e!ects that they name)” (2005, §3). 
In a similar way, telling the time through the use of Coordinated 
Universal Time suggests a commitment to “universal coordination.” 
However it is as if our society’s stated commitment to being in time is 
taken as su"cient proof that it actually is in time. #is assurance may 
actually be blocking our ability to perform the other actions required for 
this commitment to be realized. Like the rhetoric of the institutional 
diversity statement, UTC appears to announce a certain social 
commitment, while enabling the status quo to continue unimpeded. 
Put in terms of Ahmed’s example above, it is as if our modes of telling 
the time say “if we are committed to providing accurate methods of 
coordination (and we have said that we are), then how can our methods 
be inaccurate?” We say that we will tell the time, but do not then 
perform the necessary actions to ensure that we remain coordinated 
with the changes we need to be most aware of. #us, if we are to break 
out of this non-performative mode, we may need to lose a little bit of 
faith and step back from our assurance that our clocks are accurate so 
that we can begin to think through how we might recalibrate them in 
new kinds of ways.
Alternate Conventions in the Present
Coming to see statements that tell the time as performative speech acts 
not only helps to shed light on why our temporal conventions are a 
problem in the current context, it also provides clues for how these 
conventions might be transformed. Ideally, when performatives work, 
it is because there are shared social conventions providing them with 
the supportive context that allows them to be understood by others. “I 
promise” works because both those saying it and hearing it understand 
what a promise is, the proper ways to make one, and the kinds of 
actions one has to perform subsequently for it to remain valid. Absent 
of such conventions and contexts, however, a new phrase or device 
may have little chance of having a signi$cant e!ect, since it is more 
easily dismissed as nonsense or as irrelevant. %at I want to outline 
in this section, then, is an approach that takes seriously the power of 
conventions and the di"culties of altering them but still allows for the 
possibility of social change. #is approach will draw together Jacques 
Derrida’s work on the “originary performative” and Donna Haraway’s 
work on $gurations. %at is particularly interesting about each of their 
approaches is their discomfort with the desire to disavow a particular 
present convention in order to shift to a radically new one. Instead, in 
their di!erent ways, they each argue that the conventions most likely 
to succeed in transforming dominant conventions are already available 
within the (contradictory and multiple) present. 
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Key to Derrida’s interest in speech act theory is the possibility that 
performatives might be both productive and active, even while failing 
to conform to accepted conventions and regulations. In Specters of Marx, 
for example, he thinks through the possibility of transformative speech 
acts that do not either completely align or completely exceed a particular 
set of conventions, but instead cause productive tensions within a 
context itself. !ese “originary” performatives exhibit a creative “force 
of rupture” (1994, 31). Derrida suggests that this rupture does not in and 
of itself create a new convention or context; instead it entices others 
to produce new conventions, institutions, and traditions in response 
to it. A practical example of this can be found in an interview with 
Maurizio Ferraris, where Derrida discusses the di"culties of translating 
philosophical texts (Derrida and Ferraris 2001). He notes that “A 
work that appears to defy translation is at the same time an appeal for 
translation; it produces translators, and new protocols of translation; it 
produces other events that make it possible for a translation that does 
not exist to be produced” (2001, 16). #at he is thus suggesting is 
that there are some performatives that can work outside of a receiving 
context, without blocking action (as Ahmed’s non-performatives do), 
but by instead inspiring active and creative responses to the enigma 
they represent. !at is, rather than acting by conforming to conventions, 
they act by calling for conventions. 
According to Derrida then, the trick, when seeking to transform 
restrictive conventions, is to look for something within a particular 
context that goes against the dominant currents and yet seems to call 
for greater recognition or awareness. !ese less established currents 
are always available, since even while there are indeed strong and 
established conventions, “each and every time, epoch, context, culture, 
each and every national, historical or disciplinary moment, has a certain 
coherence, but also a certain heterogeneity—it is a system in which 
there are zones of greater and of lesser receivability.” !is means that 
even within $rmly established conventions “there is another current, 
as yet secondary, virtual, inhibited—it waits pregnant with a possible 
receivability” (2001, 15–16). !e task of those who are called by 
this virtual current is to prepare a place for its reception, to develop 
protocols, concepts, and audiences that enable it to become more 
widely accessible. Promisingly for my purposes here, this suggests that 
the potential to develop new devices that could signal the fundamental 
changes transforming the planet is already at work in the present.
With Derrida’s account in mind, I want to turn to Donna Haraway’s 
account of her method of $guration, which has a number of a"nities 
to the notion of the originary performative, but which I would argue 
signi$cantly extends our understanding of the hospitality towards 
the unknown that Derrida advocates. Put brie%y, Haraway’s method 
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emphasizes the development of speci!c !gures that intervene into 
habitual ways of both living in and understanding the world in order 
to denaturalize the commonsense feel of conventions and open them 
up so that things may work di"erently. She writes, for example, that 
“!gures must involve at least some kind of displacement that can trouble 
identi!cations and certainties” (Haraway 1997, 11). Like Derrida’s 
originary performatives, then, her !gures also bring with them “a force 
of rupture.” 
But Haraway’s !gures also bring a much more explicit attention to 
the way the potential that arises from those “virtual currents” is not a 
purely imaginative one, but arises from speci!c material contexts. She 
writes, for example, that the !gures at work in her book .en Species 
Meet are all “mundanely here, on this earth, now” (Haraway 2008, 5). 
Figurations are not, therefore, only illustrative thought experiments. 
Rather they encompass (and thus challenge) what has been divided 
into “reality” and “!ction.” In discussing her work to date she argues 
that her “!gures have always been where the biological and literary or 
artistic come together with all of the force of lived reality.” #at is, her 
!gurations are “at the same time creatures of imagined possibility and 
creatures of !erce and ordinary reality” (4). Developing new clocks in 
line with this approach, then, would involve paying attention to the 
potential at work in the present, but with the realization that these new 
devices will not be invented from scratch but are already immanent and 
embodied. Indeed they may actually already be telling our time. 
Haraway’s work suggests a number of further issues that I would 
like to brie$y discuss before looking at some examples of new kinds of 
clocks. First is the importance of developing a !guration that is able to 
intervene into everyday embodied and a"ective experience. As I have 
argued elsewhere (2006), Haraway’s !gures are not produced for the 
fun of purely intellectual play but “for the hope for liveable worlds” 
(Haraway 1994, 60). As such, they ideally do not remain distant from 
everyday life, but provide charismatic reframings that draw people into 
a di"erently organized world. #at is, “!gurations are performative 
images that can be inhabited” (Haraway 1997, 11). #ese !gures are 
not inhabited alone, however. Rather her !gures are fundamentally 
about transforming understandings and experiences of relationality. In 
doing so Haraway seeks to move away from more entrenched binary 
modes of relating towards more complex, contradictory inter-relations. 
#e !gures she describes “gather up those who respond to them into 
unpredictable kinds of ‘we’” (Haraway 2008, 5). #is second issue of 
relationality is particularly important given my argument that clocks 
do not provide an objective measure of the world, but rather orient 
us toward particular relational worlds. In doing so, they a"ord certain 
modes of relationality, while hindering or obscuring others. In our 
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current context, where the hyper-separation of “nature” and “culture” 
continues to hinder our response to multiple crises, the clock that 
could orient us towards a more complex and unpredictable “we” would 
appear to be vitally important.
 Summing up the work performed by !gurations, Haraway at one 
point describes them as “condensed maps of contestable worlds” (1997, 
11). "is phrase neatly captures the multiple interventions made by these 
complex devices. It suggests that those !gurations that are productive 
draw together worlds that have been distanced from each other, without 
however doing so with the aim of harmonization or homogenization. 
In this they may be thought of as performative, since to paraphrase 
Shannon Jackson, they do not simply re#ect a world, rather they 
actually have the power to make a world (2004, 2).5 Signi!cantly, while 
Haraway uses the spatial metaphor of the map, she does tie her !gures to 
temporality and timing. "is can be seen particularly in Modest_Witness@
Second_Millennium. FemaleMan©_OncoMouseTM, where she argues that 
“!gures always bring with them some temporal modality that organizes 
interpretive practice” (Haraway 1997, 11). Her !gure of the Modest_
Witness@Second_Millennium, for example, presents challenges both 
to the norms of self representation within scienti!c practice, as well as 
the temporal senses of history, progress, and apocalypse which Haraway 
argues inform this practice (1997, 9–10). "e more recent companion 
species also bring complex temporalities with them, which, according 
to Haraway, “comprehend all the possibilities activated in becoming 
with, including the heterogeneous scales of evolutionary time for 
everybody but also the many other rhythms of conjoined process” 
(2008, 25). Given this it seems entirely plausible that !gurations do 
more than draw together worlds that have been distanced from each 
other. "ey would also appear to be capable of drawing together worlds 
that have been desynchronized or detemporalized from each other. In 
recalibrating our devices for telling the time, then, we might very well 
be looking for !gures that can act as “condensed clocks of contestable 
worlds.” 
To summarize then, the approach that I have outlined here suggests 
a number of issues that might need to be addressed when thinking 
about how to tell the time in the context of climate change, resource 
depletion, and mass extinctions. First, following Derrida, these clocks 
would appear to have the best chance of succeeding if they arise, not 
from outside of our current conventions, but from within them. Second, 
both Derrida and Haraway emphasize the importance of being drawn 
in by a particular !gure, of it being intriguing in some way, without 
  "e full quote from Jackson is “linguistic acts don’t simply re#ect a world 
but that speech actually has the power to make a world” (2004, 2).
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!tting neatly into what is already known, as well as the need to maintain, 
rather than resolve, complexity and di"erence. #ird, Haraway’s work, 
in particular, suggests the need for a clear emphasis on materiality, 
relationality, and the a"ective power of !gurations. Combined, Derrida 
and Haraway’s approaches skirt between some of the most stubborn 
oppositions in thinking around social change and refuse to commit 
to either reality versus imagination or revolution versus reformation. 
Instead they provide an approach that emphasizes the importance of 
learning how to be hospitable to those ways of being and thinking that 
are, as yet, on the edges of receivability.
From Doomsday to the Long Now
#e idea that standard clock time is not adequate in the context of 
climate change is not, itself, new. Impending crises regularly inspire an 
interest in rethinking how we tell the time. Given this, I want to now 
look at a few examples of how others have sought to address this issue. 
#e Doomsday Clock is perhaps one of the most prominent examples. 
It was created in 1947 by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (BAS) as 
a way of indicating the likelihood of nuclear war (BAS, 2010a). Unlike 
UTC, which problematically projects an unending future no matter 
the context, the Doomsday clock uses the commonly understood 
convention of midnight to signify the end of time. #e meaning of the 
minute hand is transformed, no longer representing quantitative time, 
but rather the likelihood of reaching Doomsday. Interestingly, its remit 
was recently expanded to include the risks posed by climate change 
and biological weapons (BAS, 2010b), and, in part due to inaction 
over climate change, the clock was moved forward one minute to !ve 
minutes to midnight in January 2012 (BAS, 2012). 
Another, more recent, example is the One Hundred Months project 
developed by the New Economics Foundation (NEF) (2008). Like the 
Doomsday clock, the 100 Months clock does not project an empty 
future but rather counts down to a !nite end point. Started in August 
2008 it indicates the number of months that the NEF suggest are still 
available for us to take action to avoid the Earth’s average surface 
temperature rising above 2ºC. #ey argue that if we have not acted 
within this time period, it will be too late. Andrew Simms, NEF’s policy 
director, suggests that in providing this representation, “there is now a 
di"erent clock to watch than the one on the wall.” Far from indicating 
empty, homogenous time, the 100 Months clock instead “tells us that 
everything that we do from now matters” (2008 n.p.). 
Implicitly supporting the construction of both of these clocks is 
the assumption that everyday clocks are not all-encompassing and 
are in fact obscuring key changes in the world. Both propose another 
measure of the “before” and “after” in order to facilitate a communal 
MICHELLE BASTIAN40
reorientation towards the dangerous changes currently taking place. 
!e new clocks devised by the NEF and the BAS thus both "t well with 
the expanded de"nition of the clock that I proposed above. Both signal 
di#erent changes (the number of months left to act and the likelihood 
of doomsday) so that their users can maintain an awareness of, and thus 
be able to coordinate themselves with, signi"cant issues in the present.
Both the Doomsday Clock and the 100 Months Clock try to raise 
awareness of our closeness to disaster by challenging the standard clock’s 
projection of an undi#erentiated future and instead indicating an end 
of time that is very close to the present. However another approach has 
been to argue that the problem is not that we are responding too slowly, 
but rather that our experience of time is too accelerated and short term. 
!ere have thus been a variety of e#orts to intervene into shared sensory 
experiences and expectations around the pace of time, including the 
slow food movement (Petrini 2001) and the related slow city movement 
(e.g., Mayer and Knox 2006, Pink 2007, and Parkins 2004). !ere is 
also a clock that is being developed in order to a#ord a deeper, more 
far-reaching apprehension of time. !e Long Now Foundation are 
currently working towards building a 10,000 year clock that, rather 
than marking the frenetic oscillations of the cesium atom, signi"cantly 
stretches the interval between the “before” and the “after” (Brand 2000). 
!e clock, "rst proposed by Danny Hills, will be one that “ticks once a 
year. !e century hand advances once every 100 years, and the cuckoo 
comes out on the millennium” (quoted in Kelly n.d.). Clearly aware 
of the way particular kinds of clocks will in turn tell particular stories 
about the world, Steward Brand argues that “such a clock, if su$ciently 
impressive and well-engineered, would embody deep time for people” 
(Brand n.d.). !us, in building it they are aiming to intervene into the 
public imaginary by producing a clock that “should be charismatic to 
visit, interesting to think about, and famous enough to become iconic 
in the public discourse. Ideally, it would do for thinking about time 
what the photographs of Earth from space have done for thinking 
about the environment” (Brand n.d.). So if the Doomsday Clock and 
the One Hundred Months Clock are focused on providing a means 
for coordinating with imminent crises, the 10,000 year clock provides 
a di#erent orientation that suggests the possibility of continuity and 
longevity and thus, perhaps, a dash of optimism. 
Each of these clocks seeks to provide ways of challenging the 
empty homogeneous time of the conventional clock and so arguably 
move towards the development of more adequate ways of telling 
the time in our current context. However, while the success of these 
interventions into public time needs to be more closely analyzed, I am 
initially hesitant about their approaches. In particular it is not clear 
that they provide ways of indicating the wide varieties of clashing time 
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scales and modes that characterize the present and which we need 
to negotiate in our responses to climate change, resource depletion, 
and mass extinctions. As many writers have suggested, the variety 
of processes involved in each of these crises do not neatly match up. 
Instead there are clashes evident within a multitude of areas, including: 
multidisciplinary research that seeks to integrate scienti!c and social 
approaches (Wood 2008), for example nuclear waste research (Moser 
et al. 2012); the short term character of business management practices 
and longer term environmental processes (Adam et al. 1997); scienti!c 
research and social action (Brace and Geoghegan 2010); and within 
environmental political movements themselves (Szerszynski 2002). 
Barbara Adam draws together these contradictions in her notion of 
“timescapes,” suggesting that we need to !nd better ways of indicating 
“the full temporal complexity of speci!c culture-nature intersections in 
their in/visible and im/material expressions” (Adam et al. 1997, 81). 
"us, !guring out how to “coordinate” ourselves within a context of 
co-occurring and con#icting actions, values, loyalties, fears, and hopes 
may require even more radical re!gurations of the clock.
Condensed Clocks
It is now 8:13 a.m., or so it says on my computer. From this I can 
predict a considerable amount of what is going on in my time zone at 
the moment. For example, a lot of other humans are in the last stages 
of getting ready for work. "ere are a multitude of trains and buses 
making their way around with people in them !ghting for space. "ere 
are no children in school since it is summer. "ere will be other people 
still sleeping, or only just getting to sleep after being up all night. It 
would be unusual for someone to be blowing out their birthday candles 
right now, or to be at the cinema. I am let into this particular world in 
part due to the clock at the bottom right-hand corner of my computer 
screen. However its promise that everything happening in the world 
can be condensed within the time it tells is not true. My clock tells 
me nothing about what is happening on the Antarctic ice shelves. I 
cannot predict how much methane is being released from the melting 
permafrost. I do not know which creatures will go extinct today, nor 
how much plastic will reach the strange arti!cial islands forming in the 
ocean’s gyres. So, rather than coordinating our lives with and through a 
stable and predictable atom, augmented by the movements of a planet 
around a star, what if we tried coordinating our lives with something 
less predictable, but maybe more accurate for the times we live in? An 
animal perhaps, rather than a planet and an atom? A turtle? 
Not so long ago, a colleague suggested we explore the e$ects climate 
change was having on leatherback turtles. In beginning to look into the 
issue, I found a New York Times article that positioned the turtle as a key 
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indicator of the changes currently a!ecting the planet (Rosenthal 2009). 
"at stuck me in particular were comments from Carlos Drews of the 
World Wildlife Fund, who described turtles as “very good storytellers 
about the e!ect of climate change on coastal habitats,” due in part to 
the fact that “the climate is changing so much faster than before, and 
these animals depend on so much for temperature [sic]” (Rosenthal 
2009, A8). Surprisingly, in this particular public appearance, an animal 
that most often symbolizes slowness and steadiness was described as 
being best placed to tell us about speed—the speed of climate change. 
Stories about turtles have for a long time been used to explain some 
of the paradoxes of space. #e idea of “turtles all the way down,” for 
example, continues resonating long after it was $rst thought. So this 
article inspired me to wonder what stories might turtles tell us about 
time?
Undoubtedly the notion of a turtle clock, as opposed to an atomic 
clock, is unconventional and strange. Performing time in this way 
would seem to break with all our current conventions for time and 
risks being dismissed as nonsensical. But one reason why I think turtle 
clocks may be an interesting option to pursue is that, like Derrida’s 
“originary performatives,” their very unintelligibility may work to 
inspire new conventions around time. Indeed the more one dwells with 
the possibility, the more one discovers/produces current contexts that 
could provide a hospitable framework in which its potential receivability 
might become realized. 
For instance, judging the “before” and “after” in reference to other 
animals is not as unusual as it may sound. In the UK, for example, 
the arrival of songbirds has traditionally signaled the changing of the 
seasons from winter to spring.6 Certain fossils, known as index fossils, are 
important geological markers of time (O’Brien and Lyman 1999). And 
in a gruesome and bizarre story, David Landes talks about an attempt 
to use a dog as a time signaling device (2000, 155). So returning again 
to the broader de$nition of the clock that I outlined above, it is already 
the case that changes in animals (in their location, their numbers, their 
behavior) are being used as signals to guide the coordination of humans 
with what is signi$cant to them. In what follows, therefore, I want to 
explore two examples of how leatherback turtles in particular might also 
already be in popular consciousness, telling humans time. I pick these 
examples, in particular, because they also show how an attentiveness to 
 See for example this opening sentence from an article on the website for 
the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds called “#e Voices of Spring”: 
“During the spring and early summer, it’s not just the milk van that will wake 
you early—it’s dawn chorus time again” (RSPB, 2007, n.p.). With numbers of 
songbirds rapidly declining, however, this is less often the case. 
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turtles and their relations with humans enables a response to the two 
confusions McKibben discusses in regard to our conceptions of time—
the misconception that nature provides a stable background to human 
lives and the failure to recognize that perhaps it is actually humans that 
are slow-moving and unchanging.
From a certain perspective our unconventional turtle continues to 
travel in dominant currents. !is is because it is entirely possible to 
argue that turtles tell a very conventional story about the stable time 
of nature. Reiterating the sense of the “long slow accretion of epochs” 
that McKibben highlights, leatherback turtles are often described in 
terms of their long, seemingly unchanging, evolutionary history. !ey 
are described in one news article, for example, as “all but ageless” 
(Angier 2006). Further, with an evolutionary history reaching back over 
100 million years, they often provide humans with a sense of continuity 
with a deep past. As conservationist Carl Sa"na writes in his Voyage of the 
Turtle, the leatherback, “whose ancestors saw dinosaurs rule and fall, is 
itself the closest thing we have to a living dinosaur” (2006, 1). In just 
one example of this trope’s wider use—the promise of experiencing a 
connection with this deep slow time is often put to work in promotional 
material for tourists wanting to encounter leatherbacks at their nesting 
sites.
Looking a little more closely, however, the turtle can also be seen 
traveling on secondary currents that disrupt this nostalgic portrayal 
of them. Attending to the evolutionary histories of these seemingly 
placid, stable creatures tells an alternate, and much less placid, story 
about an unstable planet and the di#culties of surviving a changing 
climate. As Sa"na discusses a little further on in his book, there have 
been at least six species of Leatherbacks; however “only two species 
of Leatherbacks entered the Pleistocene and faced its ice ages. Only 
one emerged” (2006, 22). !is means that “the modern Leatherback 
survived conditions that extinguished other Leatherback species about 
a million years ago” (2006, 22). Even then the survival of this one species 
was not assured. Instead “all Leatherbacks living worldwide today are 
genetically so similar that even the modern Leatherback probably came 
within a $ipper’s length of extinction” (Sa"na 2006, 22; see also Dutton 
et al. 1999). From this perspective the leatherback proposes that a quite 
di%erent account of deep time needs to be thought, one that is nicely 
captured in Nigel Clark’s claim that:
As an alternative to both linear, progressivist narratives and $ash-bang 
apocalypticism, attentiveness to long-term dwelling viewed in tandem 
with dynamic environmental history puts the stress on enduring, 
surviving, living on through whatever challenges the world delivers. 
(2008, 739)
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As Clark’s emphasis on the volatility and unpredictability of earth 
processes suggests, to have lived through deep time is not to have 
remained unchanged, but, on the contrary, to possess the ability to 
actively respond to dynamic and changeable environments.
Turtles not only tell us about the unstable time of an active Earth, 
they also tell the frustratingly slow time of human e!orts to respond 
to recognized environmental threats. In a protracted series of events 
echoed in any number of conservation campaigns, Sa"na recounts 
e!orts in the U.S. to reduce the high numbers of turtles drowning 
in "shing and shrimping nets (2006, 80–151). Although sea turtles 
had been recognized as an endangered species since the late 1970s, 
regulations to require devices that enabled turtles to escape from "shing 
nets took some time to be passed. Working on estimates of around 
twelve thousand turtles drowning per year, Sa"na writes “one hundred 
thousand dead sea turtles after the government "rst recognized the 
problem . . . the Fisheries Service in June 1987 published regulations 
requiring that shrimp nets of the southeast U.S. and Gulf states carry 
“turtle-excluder devices” (TEDs) to take e!ect several months hence” 
(Sa"na 2006, 84). However, a variety of issues impacted the e!ectiveness 
of the legislation, including court injunctions and con#icts between 
state and federal governments. Even once regulations were passed, 
the size of the required devices was not adequate for larger sea turtles, 
particularly adult leatherbacks and loggerheads, to escape (see Epperly 
and Teas 1999 and Lewison, Crowder, and Shaver 2003). Indeed, “not 
until August 2003 did the federal government require Leatherback-
sized turtle-escape devices in shrimp nets along the U.S. East Coast 
and Gulf of Mexico” (Sa"na 2006, 89). 
 In his account, Sa"na is critical both of the government agencies 
involved and the shrimpers for their failures to respond in a timely way. 
However, what this example highlights is not necessarily the failure of 
particular groups to “get with the program,” but rather the multiple 
and con#icting temporalities of conservation, the complexities of which 
mean that “timeliness” will be de"ned di!erently by the various actors 
involved. Moving according to di!erent trajectories, each participant 
will draw on di!erent histories in the hopes of di!erent futures. So, 
while particular e!orts to save sea turtles will appear timely to some, for 
others they may actually be experienced as the breaking or arresting of 
time. As Sa"na himself points out, shrimpers are also potentially facing 
their own extinctions, in that they are having to make “generation-
breaking decisions” about whether to continue with businesses that are 
experiencing their own pressures (2006, 100). In this case, the turtle 
clock, which here tracks the changes in turtle populations alongside the 
lack of change in human shrimping techniques, enables us to maintain 
an awareness of the inter-meshing relations of turtles, governments, 
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conservationists, and shrimpers. In doing so, it foregrounds the 
inherent di!culties of coordination in a complex multi-species world, 
rather than hiding such work under the cover of a “universal” time. 
"ese two small examples illustrate how telling the time with turtles 
opens up the complexities and incommensurabilities in what is all too 
often assumed to be a shared and all-encompassing present. As Euan 
Ferguson wrote recently in the U.K. Observer newspaper, exploring the 
interconnections between massive jelly#sh blooms in the Irish Sea and 
increased Leatherback sightings in the U.K.:
"e more I learn, the more complicated becomes the world of marine 
biology. Sometimes it must seem as if there’s only one law and that’s 
the one of unintended consequences. It strikes me . . . that, if Europe 
ever got unaccountably sensible about #shing, then herring . . . might 
get a look-in again in the Irish Sea. $ich would be good for eating 
the bad jelly#sh. But that would then be bad for the good turtles, who 
would then  . . . well, who’d be a marine biologist? "eir heads must 
hurt all the time, and not just from the diving. (2011)
Following the turtle rather than the atom, we are led into a complicated 
world where there is no clear path forward. And yet these are our times, 
and so this is arguably what we need to coordinate ourselves with. In 
this way then, the #gure of the turtle makes visible alternative temporal 
conventions that are already at work within the same Western culture 
dominated by an abstract clock time, and which may better serve us. 
Of course the turtle-clock is just one example—one condensed clock 
for this contestable world. Such a clock, in breaking with conventions, 
risks being unable to perform as it promises, winding up perhaps as one 
of Austin’s unhappy performatives. Worse, it could end up as one of 
Ahmed’s non-performatives and block the ability to act, should the use 
of our strange and unusual clocks be taken as proof that we have solved 
the issues they were meant to address, without having to enact any of 
the follow-up actions that a performative requires. However, perhaps 
the leatherback’s status as one of the charismatic megafauna that “are 
so vividly present in our imaginary lives” (Rose and van Dooren 2011, 
1) might enable it to entice us into a di%erently ordered world. Rather 
than utilizing a clock that promises absolute commensurability and 
predictability, one that reduces “the time” to a sequence of numbers, 
perhaps we might gain from exploring the kinds of clocks that could 
be produced when we “coordinate” ourselves with and through other 
relationalities within our world.7 
7.  "is paper is dedicated to my godfather Kevin Walters, whose patient 
attention to his slow-&owering clivias produced so much beauty. I would 
also like to thank "om van Dooren, Noel Castree, and Nigel Clark for their 
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